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ABSTRACT 
 
Collisions of commercial ships cover the largest part of accidents scenario in waterways. 
Waterways accidents expose vessel owners and operators, as well as the public to risk. 
They attract possibility of losses such as vessel cargo damage, injuries, loss of life, 
environmental damage, and obstruction of waterways.  Collision risk is a product of the 
probability of the physical event its occurrence as well as losses of various nature 
including economic losses. Environmental problem and need for system reliability call for 
innovative methods and tools to assess and analyze extreme operational, accidental and 
catastrophic scenarios as well as accounting for the human element, and integrate these 
into a design environments part of design objectives. This paper discusses modeling of 
waterways collision risk frequency in waterways. The analysis consider mainly the 
waterways dimensions and other related variables of risk factors like operator skill, vessel 
characteristics, traffic characteristics, topographic, environmental difficulty of the transit, 
and quality of operator's information in transit which are required for decision support 
related to efficient, reliable and sustainable waterways developments. 5.3 accidents in 10, 
000 years is observed for Langat River, this considered acceptable in maritime and 
offshore industry, but for a channel using less number of expected traffic, it could be 
considered high. Providing safety facilities like traffic separation, vessel traffic 
management could restore maximize sustainable use of the channel.  
 
Keywords: Collision, risk, reliability, frequency, inland waterways, environmental 
prevention 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
Collision in waterways falls under high consequence incidents, collision data may be 
imperfect or inconstant, making it difficult to account for dynamic issues associated with 
vessels and waterways requirement. Accounting for these lapses necessitated need to base 
collision analysis on hybrid use of deterministic, probabilistic or simulation methods 
depending on the availability of a data. Developing sustainable inland water transportation 
(IWT) requires transit risk analyses of waterways components and relationship between 
factors such as environmental conditions, vessel characteristics, operators' information 
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about the waterway, as well as the incidence of groundings and collisions, using available 
data. Whatever information is available is useful for risk and reliability based decision 
work of accidents rate of occurrence, consequence and mitigation [1, 7]. Risk and 
reliability based design entails the systematic integration of risk analysis in the design 
process targeting system risk prevention, reduction that meet high level goal and leave 
allowance for integrated components of the system including environment that will 
facilitate and support a holistic approach for reliable and sustainable waterways appropriate 
and require trade-offs and advance decision-making leading to optimal design solutions.  
Frequency estimation work on channel lead to fundamental sustainable model of 
transit risk that include factors such as traffic type and density, navigational aid 
configuration, channel design and waterway configuration and classification.  For cases 
where there are insufficient historical record to support their inclusion, more 
comprehensive models of transit risk will have to rely on integral use of hybrid of 
deterministic, probabilistic, stochastic method whose result could further be simulated or 
employ expert judgment to optimize deduced result [2]. Risk based collision model are 
derivative for improvement of maritime accident data collection, preservation and limit 
acceptability using information relating to the following: 
 
i. Ports for entering incidents, traffic characteristics, frequency of accident, "barge 
train" movements as well as individual barges 
ii. Vessel characteristics, record data on actual draft and trim, presence and use of 
tugs, presence of pilots. 
iii. Environmental condition, wind speed and direction, visibility, water level, current 
speed and direction, Tide Forecast Error, Real-time Environmental Information 
etc. 
iv. Types of cargo and  vessel movements. 
v. Operator skill, quality of operator's information. 
vi. Uncertainty in surveys/charts, geographical distribution of transit, topographic 
difficulty of the transit, improve temporal resolution (transits by day or hour), 
eliminate/correct erroneous and duplicate entries (e.g. location information). 
 
This paper describes frequency analysis of risk based model, where accident frequency are 
determined and matched with waterway variables and parameter. The result hopes to 
contribute to decision support for development and regulation of inland water 
transportation.  
 
2.0 BACKGROUND  
The study area is Langat River, 220m long navigable inland water that has been under 
utilized.  Personal communication and river cruise survey revealed that collision remain the 
main threat of the waterways despite less traffic in the waterways. This make the case to 
establish risk and reliability based model for collision aversion for sustainable development 
of the waterways a necessity. Data related to historical accidents, transits, and 
environmental conditions were collected. Accident data are quite few, this is inherits to 
most water ways and that make probabilistic methods the best preliminary method to 
analyze the risk which can be optimized through expert rating and simulation methods as 
required. 
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Figure 1: Langat map 
 
 Barge and tug of capacity 5000T and 2000T are currently plying this waterway at 
draft of 9 and 15m respectively. Collisions (including contact between two vessels and 
between a vessel and a fixed structure), causes of collision linked to navigation system 
failure, mechanical failure and vessel motion failure are considered in this work towards 
design of safe and reliable the river for transportation. Safety associated with small craft is 
not taken into account. The next section describes the relevant information relating to 
channel, vessel and environment employed in the risk process. Lack of information about 
the distribution of transits during the year, the joint distribution of ship size, flag particular, 
environmental conditions become main derivative from probabilistic estimation. In total 
risk management system of various methods is used according to result expectation and 
performance contribution. The study use Langat River to a case study to test the model, 
because it is a big River with big potential that is underutilized. The testing of the model on 
Langat could help decision support for its development and regulation in future [3, 7]. The 
model described is suitable for preventive safety reliability decision for new water way 
development. When it is safe the environment is preserved and protected. 
 
3.0 BASELINE DATA 
Vessel movement, port call consists of two transits in Langat River: one into and one out of 
the port.  Safe transit data consider the same barge type and size for risk analysis are 
considered. The required radius of curvature at bends for 5000 DWT, Towed barge Length 
= Barge Length + Tug Length + Tow Line, R> (4-6) length of barge train to meet the 
navigation requirement (PIANC, 2007). Water level Mean, water level = 40cm seasonal 
variation, Existing coastal environmental current. Coastal current, Average Speed in spring 
tide 0.4 -1.2 m/s, Avg. Speed in Neap 0.2 - 1.0 m/s is considered part of environmental 
parameters [4, 10].   
Table 2:  River Langat tributary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Channel Parameters 
Width Depth 
Maneuvering lane 
Vessel clearance 
Bank suction 
Wind effect 
Current effect 
Channel with bends 
Navigation aids 
Pilot 
Tugs 
Draught 
Trim 
Squat 
Exposure allowance 
Fresh water adjustment 
Allowance maneuvering 
Overdepth allowance 
Depth transition 
Tidal allowance 
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Table 3: River width and depth parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 2: Channel width parameter       Figure 3: Channel straightening and alignment 
              
   Table 4:  Vessel requirement: Barge parameter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
                                      Table 5:  Vessel requirement: Tug parameter 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Data Collection Limitation  
Limitations in data collection poised hybrid combinatory use of historical, first principle, or 
deterministic and stochastic analysis, future data collection effort can open opportunity for 
improvement in validation analysis as well as understanding of accident risk. In this case 
the data is good enough data to model a predictive and state space analysis model of 
frequency of occurrence in the channel. Major data problems are as follows [12] 
Design 
parameter 
 Approach channel 
  Straight Bend 
98m 120m 
3-6m 3-6m 
Side slope  10H:1V 10H:1V 
Estuarine 135.7km North (44.2km) South (9.9km) 
Barge parameter  
2000 tons 5000 tons 
Length  (m) 67.3 76.2 
Beam   (m) 18.3 21.3 
Depth   (m) 3.7 4.9 
Draft    (m) 2.9 4.0 
Tugs parameter  
2000 tons 5000 tons 
Length     (m) 23.8 23.8 
Beam       (m) 7.8 7.8 
Depth      (m) 3.5 3.5 
Draft        (m) 2.8 2.8 
Horse Power (hp) 1200 1200 
Channel  width : One way Traffic
Straight channel = 98m, Bend = 120m, Depth= 6m
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i. Vessel Casualty Data: Inherent problem with causality data have missing entries, 
duplicate entries, and inaccuracies.  
ii. Environmental Data: Limitations are associated with potential change in real-time 
oceanographic data systems.  
iii. Port-Specific Data: information about safe transits counts categorization by flag, 
vessel type, vessel size, with tug escort and piloting information, taken at hourly by 
authority. 
iv. Surveys and Chart Data: it is important to compare conventional cartographic 
uncertainty and with new technology to cover additional uncertainties. 
 
4.0 SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK FOR IWT 
 
Risk and reliability based model aim to develop innovative methods and tools to assess 
operational, accidental and catastrophic scenarios. It requires accounting for the human 
element, and integrates them as required into the design environment. Risk based design 
entails the systematic integration of risk analysis in the design process. It target safety and 
environment risk prevention and reduction as a design objective. To pursue this activity 
effectively, an integrated design environment to facilitate and support a holistic risk 
approach to ship and channel design is needed. Total risk approaches enable appropriate 
trade off for advanced sustainable decision making. Waterways accident falls under 
scenario of collision, fire and explosion, flooding, grounding.  
Risk based design entails the systematic risk analysis in the design process 
targeting risk preventive reduction. It facilitates support for total risk approach to ship and 
waterways design. Integrated risk based system design requires the availability of tools to 
predict the safety, performance and system components as well as integration and 
hybridisation of safety element and system lifecycle phases. Therefore, it becomes 
imperative to develop, refine, verify, validate reliable model through effective methods and 
tools. The risk process begins with definition of risk which stands for the measure of the 
frequency and severity of consequence of an unwanted event (damage, energy, oil spill). 
Frequency at which potential undesirable event occurs is expressed as events per unit time, 
often per year. The frequency can be determined from historical data. However, it is quite 
inherent that event that don’t happen often attract severe consequence and such event are 
better analyzed through risk based and reliability model. Figure 3.2 shows main 
components of risk based design for IWT. Risk is defined as product of probability of event 
occurrence and its consequence. 
 
          Risk (R) = Probability (P) x Consequence (C)          (1)  
 
Incidents are unwanted events that may or may not result to accidents. Necessary 
measures should be taken according to magnitude of event and required speed of response 
should be given. Accidents are unwanted events that have either immediate or delayed 
consequences. Immediate consequences variables include injuries, loss of life, property 
damage, and persons in peril. Point form consequences variables could result to further loss 
of life, environmental damage and financial costs. The earlier stage of the process involves 
finding the cause of risk, level of impact, destination and putting a barrier by all mean in the 
pathway. Risk work process targets the following: 
 
i Cause of risk and risk assessment, this involve system description, identifying the 
risk associated with the system, assessing them and organising them in degree or 
matrix. IWT risk can be as a result of the following:  (i) Root cause, (ii) Immediate 
cause, (iii) Situation causal factor, (iv) Organization causal factor. 
ii Risk analysis and reduction process, this involve analytic work through deterministic 
and probabilistic method that strengthen can reliability in system. Reduction process 
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that targets initial risk reduction at design stage, risk reduction after design in 
operation and separate analysis for residual risk for uncertainty as well as human 
reliability factor.  
 
 Uncertainty risk in complex systems can have its roots in a number of factors 
ranging from performance, new technology usage, human error as well as organizational 
cultures. They may support risk taking, or fail to sufficiently encourage risk aversion. To 
deal with difficulties of uncertainty risk migration in marine system dynamic, risk analysis 
models can be used to capture the system complex issues, as well as the patterns of risk 
migration. Historical analyses of system performance are important to establish system 
performance benchmarks that can identify patterns of triggering events, this may require 
long periods of time to develop and detect. Assessments of the role of human and 
organizational error, and its impact on levels of risk in the system, are critical in distributed, 
large scale dynamic systems like IWT couple with associated limited physical oversight. 
Effective risk assessments and analysis required three parts highlighted in the relation 
below.  
 
           Risk modeling   =  Framework + Models + Process            (2) 
 
Reliability based verification and validation of system in risk analysis should be 
followed with creation of database and identification of novel technologies required for 
implementation of sustainable system. 
 
4.1 Risk Framework 
Risk framework provides system description, risk identification, criticality, ranking, 
impact, possible mitigation and high level objective to provide system with what will make 
it reliable. The framework development involves risk identification which requires 
developing understanding the manner in which accidents, their initiating events and their 
consequences occur. This includes assessment of representation of system and all linkage 
associated risk related to system functionality and regulatory impact (See Figure 4 a and b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                                                            (b) 
 
Figure 4:  IMO Risk framework 
 
Risk framework should be developed to provide effective and sound risk 
assessment and analysis. The process requires accuracy, balance, and information that meet 
high scientific standards of measurement. The information should meet requirement to get 
the science right and getting the right science. The process requires targeting interest of 
stakeholder including members of the port and waterway community, public officials, 
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regulators and scientists. Transparency and community participation helps ask the right 
questions of the science and remain important input to the risk process, it help checks the 
plausibility of assumptions and ensures that synthesis is both balanced and informative. 
Employment of quantitative analysis with required insertion of scientific and natural 
requirements provide analytical process to estimate risk levels, and evaluating whether 
various measures for risk are reduction are effective.  
 
4.2 Safety and Environmental Risk and Reliability Model (SERM) 
There is various risk and reliability tools available for risk based methods that fall under 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Figure 5 show the analysis risk model   flowchart 
choice of best methods for reliability objective depends on data availability, system type 
and purpose. However employment of hybrid of methods of selected tool can always give 
the best of what is expect of system reliability and reduced risk.  
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 (a)                                                                      (b) 
 
Figure 5:  IMO Risk framework 
 
4.3 SERM Process 
SERM intend to address risks over the entire life of the complex system like IWT system 
where the risks are high or the potential for risk reduction is greatest. SERM address 
quantitatively, accident frequency and consequence of IWT. Other risk and reliability 
components include human reliability assessment which is recommended to be carried out 
separately as part of integrated risk process. Other waterways and vessel requirement 
factors that are considered in SERM model are: (i) Construction (ii), Towing operations 
and abandonment of ship, (iii) Installation, hook-up and commissioning, and (iv) 
Development and major modifications  
Integrated risk based method combined various technique as required in a process. 
Table 2 shows available risk based design for techniques. This can be applied for each level 
of risk. Each level can be complimented by applying causal analysis (system linkage), 
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expert analysis (expert rating), and organizational analysis (Community participation) in 
the risk process. Figure 7 shows stakes holder that should be considered in risk process. 
From Figure 2, the method use is risk analysis that involves frequency analysis where the 
system is modeled with hybrid of deterministic, probabilistic and stochastic process. 
Technically, the process of risk and reliability study involves the following four areas: (i) 
System definition of high goal objective, (ii) Qualitative hazard identification and 
assessment, (iii), Quantitative hazard frequency and consequence analysis, (iv) Risk 
acceptability, sustainability and evaluation. 
 
Table 6: Risk based design techniques 
 
Process Suitable techniques 
HAZID HAZOP, What if analysis, FMEA, FMECA 
Risk analysis Frequency, consequence, FTA, ETA 
Risk evaluation Influence diagram, decision analysis 
Risk control option Regulatory, economic, environmental, function elements  
matching  and iteration 
Cost benefit analysis ICAF, Net Benefit 
Human reliability Simulation/ probabilistic 
Uncertainty Simulation/probabilistic 
Risk monitoring Simulation/ probabilistic 
 
 
The process of risk work can further be broken down into the following elements: 
 
i. Definition and problem identification 
ii. Hazard and consequence identification 
iii. Analysing the likelihood’s of occurrence 
iv. Analyzing consequences 
v. Evaluation of uncertainty 
vi.  Risk control option (RCO) and risk control measure (RCM 
vii. Sustainability of (cost safety, environment, injury, fatality, damage to structure, 
environment) and risk acceptability criteria 
viii. Reliability based model verification and validation: statistical software, 
triangulation, iteration. 
ix. Recommendation for implementation: Implement, establishing performance 
standards to verify that the arrangements are working satisfactorily and continuous 
monitoring, reviewing and auditing the arrangements 
 
Employment of these benefit provide a rational. Formal environmental protection 
structure and process for decision support guidance and monitoring about safety issues. 
The scope of sustainable risk based design under consideration involves stochastic, 
analytic and predictive process work leading to avoidance the harms in waterways. Figure 
8 shows block diagram of SERM components for IWT. Safety and Environmental Risk and 
Reliability Model (SERM) for IWT required having clear definition of the following 
issues:  
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i. Personnel and  attendance  
ii. Identify activities 
iii. Vessel accidents including passing vessel accident, crossing , random 
iv. Vessel location and waterway geography on station and in transit to shore. 
v. Impairment of safety functions through determination of likelihood of loss of key 
safety functions lifeboats, propulsion temporary refuge being made ineffectiveness 
by an accident.  
vi. Risk of fatalities, hazard or loss of life through measure of harm to people and 
sickness.  
vii. Property damage through estimation of the cost of clean-up and property 
replacement.  
viii. Business interruption through estimation of cost of delays in production.  
ix. Environmental pollution may be measured as quantities of oil spilled onto the 
shore, or as likelihood’s of defined categories of environmental impact or damage 
to infrastructures. 
 
Allowance should be made to introduce new issue defining the boundary in the 
port from time to time. The choice of appropriate types of risk tool required for the model 
depend on the objectives, criteria and parameter that are to be used. Many offshore risk 
based design model consider loss of life or impairment of safety functions. There is also 
much focus on comprehensive evaluation of acceptability and cost benefit that address all 
the risk components. Figure 9 shows the risk and reliability model combined process 
diagram. The analysis is a purely technical risk analysis. When the frequencies and 
consequences of each modelled event have been estimated, they can be combined to form 
measures of overall risk including damage, loss of life or propulsion, oil spill. Various 
forms of risk presentation may be used. Risk to life is often expressed in two 
complementary forms. The risk experienced by an individual person and societal risk. The 
risk experienced by the whole group of people exposed to the hazard (damage or oil spill).  
Accident and incident are required to be prevented not to happen at all. The 
consequence of no safety is a result of compromise to safety leading to unforgettable loses 
and environmental catastrophic. Past engineering work has involved dealing with accident 
issues in reactive manner. System failure and unbearable environmental problem call for 
new proactive ways that account for equity requirement for human, technology and 
environment interaction. The whole risk assessment and analysis process starts with system 
description, functionality and regulatory determination and this is followed by analysis of: 
(i)Fact gathering for understanding of contribution factor (ii), Fact analysis of check 
consistency of accident history, (iii) Conclusion drawing about causation and contributing 
factor, (iv) Countermeasure and recommendation for prevention of accident 
 
Most risk based methods define risk as:  
 
          Risk = Probability (Pa) x Consequence (Ca)   (3) 
 
or in a more elaborate expression risk can be defined as: 
 
     Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x {direct (short-term) consequences + (broad)           (4) 
                 Consequences}   
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In risk analysis, serenity and probability of adverse consequence hazard are  deal 
with through systematic process that  quantitatively measure , perceive risk  and value of 
system using input from all concerned waterway users and experts.  
Risk can also be expressed as: 
 
Risk = Hazard x Exposure (5) 
 
Where hazard is anything that can cause harm (e.g. chemicals, electricity, Natural 
disasters), while exposure is an estimate on probability that certain toxicity will be realized.
 
Severity may be measured by No. of people affected, monetary loss, equipment downtime 
and area affected by nature of credible accident. Risk management is the evaluation of 
alternative risk reduction measures and the implementation of those that appear cost 
effective where: 
 
Zero discharge or negative damage = Zero risk (6) 
 
The risk and reliability model subsystem in this thesis focus on the following identified 
four risks assessment and analysis application areas that cover hybrid use of technique 
ranging from qualitative to qualitative analysis (John, 2000): (i)  Failure Modes 
Identification Qualitative Approaches, (ii) Index Prioritisation Approaches, (iii) Portfolio 
Risk Assessment Approaches, and (iv) Detailed Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Approaches. 
 
5.0  COLLISIONS RISK MODELLING 
 
Collision in waterways is considered low frequency and high consequence events that have 
associative uncertainty characteristics / component of dynamic and complex physical 
system. This makes risk and reliability analysis the modest methods to deal with 
uncertainties that comes with complex systems. Employment of hybrid deterministic, 
probabilistic and stochastic method can help break the barriers associated with transit 
numbers data and other limitation. Conventionally, risk analysis work often deal with 
accident occurrence, while the consequence is rarely investigated, addressing frequency 
and consequence analyze can give clear cuts for reliable objectives. Risk and reliability 
based design can be model by conducting the analysis of following elements of risk process 
[13, 15]: 
 
i. Risk identification 
ii. Risk analyses 
iii. Damage estimation 
iv. Priotization of risk level 
v. Mitigation 
vi. Repriotization of exposure category: mitigate risk or consequence of events that 
meet  ALARP  principle. 
vii. Reassess high risk events for monitoring and control plans. 
viii. Recommendation, implementation, continuous monitoring and improvement. 
 
Collision is likely to be caused by the following factors shown in Figure 7 derived 
from fault three analyses from RELEX software. The relex software is based on fault three 
analysis where consequence of  causal events are add up through logic gate to give 
minimum cut set probability that trigger the event. It is more effective for subsystem 
analysis. 
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      P (collision) = P (propulsion failure) + P (loss of navigation failure) +   (7) 
                              P (Loss of vessel motion)  
 
There is also causes are mostly as a result of causes from external sources like 
small craft, are cause of cause, cause from other uncertainty including human error  may 
attract separate subsystem analysis. 
 
5.1 Collision Data 
Collision data are drawn from relevant marine administrator; there is expectation that most 
data gaps can be covered by the probability estimations. The Langat River work model risk 
through systemic analysis procedures for sustainable inland waterways transportation. It 
determine the probability of failure or occurrence, risk ranking, damage estimation, high 
risk to life safety, cost benefit analyze, sustainability and acceptability criteria [5, 14]. The 
study analyze causal accidental relating to navigational, mechanical failure and human 
error and ignored those identified as intentional for barge and tugs of 5000T and 2000T 
having respective drift of draft greater than 9 to 15m.  Table 7, 8 and 9 shows some of the 
annual traffic summary, collision and the consequences on Langat. Seasonal trends can be 
stochastically modeled from probabilistic result, environmental condition and traffic 
volume fluctuation is also considered negligible. For visibility, navigation is considered to 
be more risky at night than day time, the analysis follow generic assumption for evenly safe 
distribution evenly during day and night.   
 
 
    Figure 6: Collision contributing factors              Figure 7: Tugs puling barge in Langat 
                     
A critical review of risk assessment methodologies applicable to marine systems 
reiterate that the absence of data should not be used as an excuse for not taking an 
advantage of the added knowledge that risk assessment can provide on complex systems 
[6]. Approximation of the risks associated with the system can provide a definition of data 
requirements. The treatment of uncertainty in the analysis is important, and the limitations 
of the analysis must be understood. However, data management system and better approach 
can always accommodate little data or no data. Table 6 shown models that have been used 
design of system based on risks in marine industry. 
IMO and Sirkar et al (1997) methods lack assessment of the likelihood of the event, 
likewise other model lack employment of stochastic method whose result could cover 
uncertainties associated with dynamic components of channel and ship failure from causal 
factors like navigational equipment, training and traffic control [14]. Therefore, 
combination of stochastic, statistical and reliability method based on combination of 
probabilistic, goal based, formal safety assessment, deterministic methods and fuzzy 
method using historical data of waterways, vessel environmental, first principle 
deterministic and traffic data can deliver best outcome for predictive, sustainable, efficient 
and reliable model for complex and dynamic system like inland water transportation. The 
general hypothesis behind assessing physical risk model is that the probability of an 
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accident on a particular transit depends on a set of risk variables require for analysis of 
prospective reliable design.   Figure 8 shows traffic data utilized in the model. Most of the 
method above used historical data, the novel method in this paper used limited data of 
traffic used to model the physics of the system, the transfer function and stochastically 
project accident frequency. The projection is generic and can be used for any waterways 
and it consider random collision not which is not considered by previous model. 
 
Table 6 : Previous risk work 
 
 
Table 7: Tug boat and vessel activities along river for 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
   Table 8: Vessel traffic 
            
 
 
            
 
Model Application Drawback 
Brown et al (1996) Environmental Performance of 
Tankers 
 
 
Sirkar et al (1997) 
Consequences of collisions and 
groundings 
Difficulties on 
quantifying  consequence 
metrics 
Brown and 
Amrozowicz 
 
 
Hybrid use of risk assessment, 
probabilistic simulation and a spill 
consequence assessment model 
Oil spill assessment 
limited to use of fault 
three 
Sirkar et al (1997) Monte Carlo technique to estimate 
damage and spill cost analysis for 
environmental damage 
Lack of cost data 
 
 
IMO (IMO 13F 
1995) 
Pollution prevention index from 
probability distributions damage and 
oil spill. 
Lack (Sirkar et al, 1997)). 
rational 
Research Council 
Committee(1999) 
Alternative rational approach to 
measuring impact of oil spills 
Lack employment of 
stochastic probabilistic 
methods 
Prince William 
Sound,Alaska, 
(PWS (1996) 
The most complete risk assessment Lack of logical risk 
assessment framework 
(NRC,1998)) 
Volpe National 
Transportation 
Center (1997)). 
Accident probabilities using 
statistics and expert opinion. 
Lack employment of 
stochastic methods 
Puget Sound Area 
(USCG (1999). 
Simulation or on expert opinion for 
cost benefit analysis 
 
Clean up cost and 
environmental damage 
omission 
Jetty 3 nos. 
Daily 9 times. 
Weekly 63 times. 
Monthly 252 times. 
Annually 3024 times. 
Total number of barge Time Traffic 
12 Every day (24 hrs.)  
6 (every 4 hrs) Incoming 
6 (every 4 hrs) outgoing 
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Table 9: Common to traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Traffic Frequency Estimation Modeling 
Traffic density of meeting ship 
Traffic density of meeting ship: ρ = 
W
Nm
..τν
 hips/   (8) 
Where Nm is number of ships frequenting the channel, v is speed of the ship, T= time of 
traffic activities per annum and W is width of the channel. 
 
Figure 8: 5000 barge data and Langat waterway 
 
5.3  Analysis of Present Situation  
Traffic situation:  Below are representation of various collision situations for head- on, 
overtaking and crossing (angle) collision scenario (see Figure 9).  
Where: B1 = mean beam of meeting ship (m), V1 = mean speed of meeting ship (knots), B2 
= beam of subject ship (m), V2 = speed of subject ship (knots), Nm = arrival frequency of 
meeting ships (ship/time), D= relative sailing distance. 
 
Expected number of collision Ni= 9.6.B.D.ρ
 s 1/passage.                           (9) 
        
(a) overtaking                     (b) passing cases                            (c) Random 
Figure 9 Collision situations  
All Speed 2 – 3 knots 
Traffic All single way traffic 
Lay -bys Proposed four locations for Lay-bys 
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Table 10 and 11  show relevant data from previous analysis used for approximation. 
 
Table 10:  Expression for collision situation [8, 11] 
 
 
Approximations:  L=6B, D=W,  Ni= Pi (10) 
 
 
Necessary period for ship to pass the fairway T=D/v = 3000/3 = 1000 sec  (11) 
                                                                                                                              
 
 
Table 11: Failure per nautical mile and failure per passage for different waterways [8] 
 
Fairway 
cµ (failure per nautical 
mile or hour) 
Pc(failure per passage 
or encounter) 
UK 2.5 x10-5 1.x10-4 
US 1.5 x10-5 1.4.x10-5 
Japan 3.0 x10-5 1.3.x10-5 
 
 
Therefore average Pc and  cµ  = 2.5 x 10-5  for random   (12) 
 
Probability of loosing navigation control within the fairway   
 
 
 Pc =
 
Tc ⋅µ   failure / passage   (13) 
 
Probability of collision Pa= (Pi. Pc collision / passage)     (14) 
 
Collision per annual (Na) = Pa. Nm Collision per year   (15) 
 
In the frequency analysis, the annual frequency of each failure case is estimated. 
Separate frequencies are estimated for each operating phase as required. In modelling the 
development, consequences and impact of the events, each failure case is split into various 
possible outcomes. the outcomes are the end events on an event tree or chain of event trees. 
Each outcome probability is estimated by combining the probabilities for appropriate 
branches of the event tree. The outcome frequency (Fo ) is then: 
 
 
                                  FO = Fe ∏ Pb      (16) 
Expression Head – on Overtaking Random 
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Where, Fe is failure frequency, Pb probability of one segment. Not all possible outcomes are 
modeled. Representative scenarios are selected for modeling, and the scenario frequency is 
taken as: 
 
                          FS = ∑
outcomes
OF
  (17) 
 
Failure per nautical mile and failure per passage can be selected from previous 
representative work. Necessary period for ship to pass the fairway T=D/v = 3000/3 = 1000 
sec. The result of accident frequency (Fa) can be compare with acceptability criteria for 
maritime industry. If it is two high the system could be recommended to implement TSS. If 
the result is high TSS can be model to see possible reduction due to its 
implementation.Table 12 shows frequency risk acceptability criteria for maritime and 
offshore  industry. 
 
Table 12: Frequency acceptability criteria 
 
5.4       Frequency Analysis Result  
This result indicates that the collision in Langat is not risk on ALARP graph. Accident per 
year of 5.3E-5 is observed for current 3 number of vessel operating at speed of 3 knot. But 
physical observation revealed that there is significant and exception increase in collision 
that needs to be address for a channel with less traffic density.  It is also observed from the 
plot of frequency Vs speed that when traffic density is changing traffic density of 5 and 6 
and speed up to 5 considered to be cause high risk of accident frequency in the waterway 
(See Figure 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     (a)                                                                  (b) 
Figure 10: Accident frequency Vs at changing number of ship 
Frequency classes Quantification 
Very unlikely once per 1000 year or more likely 
Remote once per 100- 1000 year 
Occasional once per 10- 100 year 
Probable once per 1- 10 years 
Frequent more often than once per year 
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Figure 11 shows accident frequency at changing width and beam of the channel. Risk is 
acceptable for accident per 10, 000 year, if proposed maintenance of channel improvement 
plan is implemented. Beam and wide have linear relationship (3B=W). 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                                     
                                      (a)                                                                    (b) 
 
  Figure 11: Accident frequency Vs beam and width of the channel 
 
The maximum speed is round 10 knot for width of 64m and probability of 1/1000 years, 
other speed above this are intolerable. As width of the channel decrease there is higher risk 
-> Accident frequency probability increase. The maximum width considered for Langat 
River is 64; this width is considered too small and risky for the channel for accident per 
1000 years. Different speed should be advised to ship for such situation. Width of channel 
can change as a result of erosion.  Increasing channel width to 250m could allow speed of 
20 knot at acceptable Fa (Na) of 1x10E-4. Ship operating at Langat at 3 knot at River 
Langat, is considered not high risk for accident per 100, 000 years. The regression equation 
for the trend is represented by y is 2E-08x + 1E-05 @ R² is 1. Similar trend is observe for 
Figure 12b, the beam and width are related according to PIANC W=3B AND L=6B. Table 
14 shows regression equations for the frequency analysis. 
Figure 12(a) and (b) shows cross plotting of the channel variable, both plots are the 
same; the defense is that Figure 12(b) is logged because of large number shows the risk 
level for all channel parameters variables (speed, width, number of ships, and beam of ship). 
It is observed that the maximum of ship can up to 4, at the point where speed and Number 
of ship curves meet, provided all channel and vessel safety parameters are in place.  
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               (b) 
 
Figure 12: Cross plotting of channel variables (speed, width, number of ships, and beam of 
ship) 
 
Table 13: Regression equation for Frequency analysis 
 
 
6.0  UNCERTAINTY AND SYSTEM COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
 
6.1  Subsystem Level Analysis 
For total risk work the following analysis could perform separately as part of subsystem 
risk level analysis include (i) power transmission (loss of propulsion), (ii) navigation (loss 
of mooring function and (iii) human reliability, subsystem level analysis can be facilitated 
by using frequency calculation through Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) modeling involve top 
down differentiation of event to branches of member that cause them or participated in the 
causal chain action and reaction. While consequence calculation can be done by using 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), where probability is assigned to causal factor leading to 
certain event in the event tree structure. 
 
6.2  Channel Complexity Analysis 
Channel complexity that could be addressed in the risk and reliability work are visibility 
weather, squat, bridge, river bent and human reliability. Figure 19 show channel 
complexity for Langat. Poor visibility and the number of bend may increase in the risk of 
and collisions. A model extracted from Dover waterway studies concluded with the 
following: 
 
       Fog Collision Risk Index (FCRI) = ( P1+ VI1+ P2+ VI2+ P3 . VI3 )      (18) 
 
Fa @Nm changing 
Speed 
y = 2E-05e-0.11x R² = 0.826 Exponential 
Fa @V y = 2E-05e-0.11xR² = 0.826 R² = 1 Square 
Fa W y = 2E-08x + 1E-05 R² = 1 Square 
Fa B y = 9E-07x + 0.000 R² = 0.999 Linear 
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Where:  = Probability of collision per million encounters,  = Fraction of time that the 
visibility is in the range k, K = Visibility range: clear (>4km), Mist/Fog (200m- 4km), 
Tick/dense (less than 200m). Empirically derived means to determine the relationship 
between accident risk, channel complexity parameters and VTS is given by equation : 
 
R = -0.37231 - 35297C + 16.3277N + 0.2285L -0.0004W + 0.01212H + 0.0004M      (19) 
 
For predicted VTS consequence of 100000 transit, C = 1 for an open approach area 
and 0 otherwise, N = 1 for a constricted waterway and 0 otherwise, L = length of the traffic 
route in statute miles, W = average waterway/channel width in yards, H = sum of total 
degrees of course changes along the traffic route, M = number of vessels in the waterway 
divided by L. 
Barge movement creates very low wave height and thus will have insignificant 
impact on river bank erosion and generation of squat event. Speed limit can be imposed by 
authorities for wave height and loading complexity. Human reliability analysis is also 
important to be incorporated in the channel; complexity risk work, this can be done using 
questionnaire analysis or the technique of human error rate prediction THERP probabilistic 
relation 
                    PEA = HEPEA 

 CWFPSm
k kk
+∑
=
⋅⋅1
  (20) 
 
Where: PEA = Probability of error for specific action,HEPEA = Nominal operator error 
probability for specific error, PSFK = numerical value of kth performance sapping factor, 
WK= weight of PSFK (constant), m=number of PSF, C= Constant. 
 
6.3  Reliability Based Validation 
Reliability analysis is designed to cater for uncertainty and to provide confident on the 
model. It is important for this to be carried out separately. Reliability work could include 
projection for accident rate for certain number of year the following techniques:  
 
(1)  Accident mean, variance and standard deviation from normal distribution  
 
For 10 years =>Mean ( µ ) = 10 x Na (21)  
 
 
Variance (σ ) = 10 x Na x (1-Na), Standard deviation = σ , Z = (X- µ ) / σ     (22) 
 
(2)  Stochiatic process using poison distribution, Year for system to fail from binomial, 
mean time to failure and poison distribution, or determination of exact period for next 
accident using binomial function. Ship collisions are rare and independent random event in 
time. The event can be considered as poison events where time to first occurrence is 
exponentially distributed. 
 
         Fr ( N/γ , T ) = eγ. T( ) γ , ( γ.T )N). N!                                                  (23) 
 
Binomial distribution – for event that occurs with constant probability P on each trail, the 
likelihood of observing k event in N trail is binomial distribution. 
 
L(K/N,P)= )(
Ρ
Ν
p k  (1-P)N.K (24) 
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Where average number of occurrence is NP. (3) Comparing the model behaviour apply to 
other rivers of relative profile and vessel particular. (4). Triangulating analysis of sum of 
probability of failure from subsystem level failure analysis. And (5) Implementation of 
TSS is one of the remedies for collision risk observed and predicted in Langat; this can be 
done through integration of normal distribution along width of the waterways and 
subsequent implementation frequency model. And the differences in the result can reflect 
improvement derived from implementation of TSS.  
 
 (x) = 
1
21 12( )
2
e x
µµ pi
−
−
  (25) 
 
 (x) = 
1
21 12( )
2
e x
µµ pi
−
−
  (26) 
 
(3)  Safety level and cost sustainability analysis. Figure 13 shows the best accident 
frequency that is acceptable,. Ct is is the total cost, Co is the cost of damage, and Cc is the 
cost of repair. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Risk cost benefit analysis 
6.4 Validation Result  
Validation and reliability analysis of the model yield the following result. Figure 14 shows 
accident frequency residual plot from Minitab is shown with good fitness. Figure 15: 
Shows accident consequence validations, accident consequence good to fit to the method, 
residual graph of Cumulative Density Function (CDF) profile tracing infinity. In this 
analysis Frequency is refer to as Fa or Na. 
Figure 14: Accident frequency residual plot    Figure 15: Accident consequence validation 
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Figure 16 shows residual histograms distribution diagram for accident frequency, skewed 
to low risk area, outlier can be removed. 
 
Figure 16: Residual histograms distribution diagram for accident frequency 
 
Figure 17(a) Shows Log normal plots Accident frequency (Na), distribution shows a good 
to fit. Curve Figure 17(b) also show a very good curve fit for the model. 
 
(a)                                                                     (b) 
 
Figure 17 :  Log normal plot Accident frequency (Na) 
  
 
Figure 18 shows process reliability capability, the fitting of the curve revealed the 
reliability of the frequency model. 
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Figure 18:  Process capability 
 
Figure 19 shows the matrix plot for the model, the safe areas for the variable workability 
are shown in the matrix plot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                             
(a)                                                                          (b) 
Figure 19:  Matrix plot 
 
Figure 20 a, b, and c shows the capability report for the model.  
 
(a)                                                                        (b) 
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Stability
eliminate any special cause variation in your process before continuing with this analysis.
stable, examine the control charts on the Diagnostic Report. Investigate out-of-control points and
Stability is an important assumption of capability analysis. To determine whether your process is
Subgroups
Number of
sources of process variation when collected over a long enough period of time.
You have 50 subgroups. For a capability analysis, this is usually enough to capture the different
Normality
estimates should be reasonably accurate.
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of Data
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reasonably precise capability estimates. The precision of the estimates decreases as the number of
The total number of observations is less than 100. You may not have enough data to obtain
Check Status Description
Capability Analysis for FA
Report Card
 
                                                                          
(c) 
 
Figure 20:  Log normal plot Accident frequency (Na) 
 
7.0  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Hybrid of deterministic, statistical, historical, probabilistic and stochastic method along 
with channel and vessel profile baseline data has been used to model accident possibility in 
waterway in order to meet condition for safe transits, and environmental conditions for 
inland waterway.  Factors such as vessel type and size, traffic density, speed and visibility 
conditions are major risk factor of accidents the probabilistic method represent reliable 
method to develop models for safety and environmental prevention and collision accident 
risk  aversion who precedence is could be short term (damage) or long term (impact of oil 
outflow) environmental impact.  Accident collision per number of year has been 
determined for potential decision support for limit definition for number of ship, speed, 
required width and beam of ship.  Variables that affect accident rates have been simulated 
for necessary limit acceptability purpose for the channel. Accident rate has increased 
compare to previous year, a situation that required attention for solution. Advantage of 
implementing of TSS in respect to beam requirement is also presented.  Implications of 
concept of uncertainty can help also on decision support relating to navigational aids and 
transit regulations for poor visibility conditions as well has employment of improved 
navigation systems, such as electronic charts, GPS receivers, and VTS, to  mitigate causal 
factors.  
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